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Marching to the Beat of the EU's Drum:
Refining the Collective Management of Music
Rights in the United States to Facilitate the
Growth of Interactive Streaming
GARY WARREN HUNT III*
ABSTRACT

In the digital era, interactive streaming is now the preferred method
for music consumers to access their favorite albums and songs. The
traditional copyright system used to administer music rights and
royalties has not evolved accordingly, which not only impedes progress
by music platform innovators, but also frustrates artist, labels, and
composers who are unable to reap the benefits of their music rights.
This Note examines the complex process interactive streaming
services undergo to obtain the rights necessary to stream music through
their platforms, which involves a discussion of collective rights
organizations. This Note then argues that the European Directive on
collective rights management offers mechanisms that the United States
Copyright Office should adopt to improve collective music rights
management in the United States. Finally, this Note argues that creating
a global authoritativerights database (GARD) that ties use to ownership
is necessary to move the music rights administrationprocess into the
digital age.
INTRODUCTION

Online music service providers have changed the way consumers
access music. There appears to be an irreversible trend in music
distribution: users now prefer music-as-a-service over music-as-a-
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product.1 Instead of going to the store to purchase a CD or downloading
music on iTunes, consumers today primarily utilize online streaming
services, such as Apple Music and Spotify, 2 to access their favorite
albums and songs. In 2014, Nielsen's Music 360 study found that 164
billion on-demand tracks were streamed across audio and video
platforms, an increase of about 54 percent from 2013.3 In 2015, digital
music revenues overtook physical revenues for the first time, accounting
for 45 percent of overall global industry revenues. 4 Streaming comprises
a majority of digital music revenues which now account for 50 percent of
total recorded music revenues globally.5
Music streaming is not only prominent in the United States, where
digital channels now account for 66 percent of the music market, 6 but
also throughout Europe, where music streaming revenue grew to 45.5
percent in 2016.7 Although digital streaming services tend to be userfriendly and convenient for consumers on the front-end, digital service
providers must navigate a complex licensing process on the back-end to
avoid infringing content owners' rights. The music industry leverages
collective rights organizations, commonly referred to as performing
rights organizations (PROs) in the United States and collective
management organizations (CMOs) in the European Union (the EU), to
streamline the licensing process, but there is still room for improvement
given the innate complexity of music licensing, the continued lack of
transparency, and the efficiency in the licensing process.
Today, the two primary types of digital streaming services are
noninteractive and interactive.8 A noninteractive service is not wholly
customizable by users. Instead of allowing users to stream a specific

1. RETHINK MUSIC, FAIR MUSIC: TRANSPARENCY AND PAYMENT FLOWS IN THE MUSIC
INDUSTRY 6, https://www.berklee.edu/sites/default/files/Fair%20Music%20-%20Transpare

ncy%20and%20Payment%20Flows%20in%20the%20Music%20Industry.pdf
(last visited
Mar. 28, 2018).
2. INT'L FED'N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., GLOBAL MUSIC REPORT: MUSIC
CONSUMPTION EXPLODING WORLDWIDE 38 (2016), http://www.ifpi.org/downloads/GMR
2016.pdf.
3. Everyone Listens to Music, But How We Listen Is Changing, NIELSON (Jan. 22,
2015), http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/2015/everyone-listens-to-music-but-ho
w-we-listen-is-changing.html.
4. INT'L FED'N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., supra note 2, at 8.
5.

INT'L FED'N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., GLOBAL MUSIC REPORT 2017: ANNUAL

STATE OF THE INDUSTRY 10 (2017), http://www.ifpi.org/downloads/GMR2017.pdf.
6.
7.

INT'L FED'N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., supra note 2, at 11.
INT'L FED'N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., supra note 5, at 15.

8. Jason Koransky, Digital Dilemmas: The Music Industry Confronts Licensing for
On-Demand Streaming Services, 8 LANDSLIDE, Jan.-Feb. 2016, at 2, https://www.amer
icanbar.org/publications/landslide/2015-16/j anuary-february/digital dilemmas-music
industry-confrontslicensing-ondemand streaming-services.html.
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song, noninteractive services allow users to tailor the songs streamed
for them by genre.9 An example of a noninteractive service is Pandora
or any similar internet radio platform.10 An interactive service (also
known as an on-demand service), in contrast, allows users to select and
stream a specific song or album within the service's catalog." Under
Section 114 of the Copyright Act, an interactive service is defined as a
service that "enables a member of the public to receive a transmission of
a program specially created for the recipient, or on request, a
transmission of a particular sound recording, whether or not as part of a
program, which is selected by or on behalf of the recipient."12 The
substantial and continuous increase in on-demand service revenue1 3 and
streaming activity1 4 demonstrates the rising popularity of interactive
music streaming services worldwide.
Although the future of the music industry may look promising, any
growth or innovation will likely be stifled by the archaic music licensing
system, particularly if it fails to adapt to the digital age. Increased
digital accessibility has financially affected the music industry,15 but
interactive music services currently operate in a copyright system that
was designed before the notion of digitally accessible music was
remotely conceivable.16 The time has come to modernize the copyright
system and develop an efficient process for digital music licensing.
Historically, copyright law was leveraged in the music industry to
protect the exclusive right of artists and composers to copy their works,
such as sheet music and, later, sound recordings.17 Today, copies of
digital media are easily created and distributed without proper and
protected compensation for artists. Thus, the copyright system needs to
be adjusted to give artists the financial incentive to continue to make
and distribute their music.

18

Issues with the current music licensing system are evidenced by the
negative connotation artists have toward online music services. 19 Artists
9. Bruce H. Kobayashi, Opening Pandora's Black Box: A Coasian 1937 View of
Performance Rights Organizationsin 2014, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 925, 929 (2015).
10. Koransky, supra note 8, at 2.
11. Id.
12. 17 U.S.C.S. § 114(j)(7) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
13. Koransky, supra note 8, at 2.
14. See, e.g., INT'L FED'N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., supra note 2, at 4.
15. See INT'L FED'N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., supra note 5, at 11.
16. Koransky, supra note 8, at 2.
17. Id.
18. See id. at 7.
19. See Charlotte Hassan, Reasons Why Some Artists Hate Spotify, DIGITAL MUSIC
NEWS (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2016/03/2 1/why-artists-pulltheir-music-from-spotify-but-not-youtube/ (noting, for example, that artists believe Spotify
destroys album sales and devalues music).
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are hesitant to use online services to distribute their music because they
feel that they are "grossly underpaid when their compositions and sound
recordings are streamed [online]." 20 The data that artists receive
regarding the use of their works is often difficult to comprehend 21 and
lacks the necessary details for artists to compute the frequency at which
their music is streamed. 22 Royalties are often paid to the wrong party
because a number of individuals may be involved in the production of a
musical piece and may claim rights to its revenue. 23 In certain
circumstances, royalties end up in what is commonly referred to as a
"black box," where the content owners entitled to royalties are not
identified and compensated due to the deficient system currently used
to reconcile usage with ownership. 24
In addition to the frustrations experienced by artists and composers,
the current complexity of music licensing limits the uptake of new,
innovative digital music services. Copyright exists "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful arts"

25

and to allow artists and composers

to earn a return on their creations to encourage their creative efforts. 26
Instead, inefficiencies in music licensing in the United States are
hindering innovation and creativity in the music industry. For example,
Spotify, perhaps the most popular international on-demand music
service provider, has operated at a loss for much of its existence. 27
Although technology can be a valuable resource for increasing the
distribution of music throughout the world, the current problems
associated with music licensing may defeat the purpose of copyright law
and limit dissemination and innovation in the music industry at large.
Considering the increasing popularity of interactive music
streaming, this note will examine the music licensing process for ondemand service providers to uncover ways to improve the licensing
process and increase transparency and efficiency. Part I discusses the
different licenses an on-demand music service provider must obtain to
stream music to consumers. Part II examines the role that collective
rights organizations play in music licensing in the United States and
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 4.

RETHINK MUSIC, supra note 1, at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
THOMAS M. LENARD & LAWRENCE J. WHITE, MOVING MUSIC LICENSING INTO THE
DIGITAL ERA: MORE COMPETITION AND LESS REGULATION 3 (2015), https://tech
policyinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/moving-music-licensing-digital-era.pdf.
27. See Ben Sisario, Spotify's Revenue Is Growing, but So Are Its Losses, N.Y. TIMES
(May 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/09/business/media/as-spotify-expandsrevenue-rises-and-losses-deepen.html.
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the European Union, and the current inefficiencies that exist. Part III
reviews the 2014 European Union Directive on collective rights
management and the implications it has for European collective
management organizations (CMOs) that manage music rights. Part IV
proposes solutions for refining music licensing in the United States,
such as establishing a transparency and governance framework similar
to that adopted by Europe, and by creating collective rights
organizations that manage both performance and mechanical rights in
music. Part IV also argues that, to optimize music licensing, the
creation of a global authoritative rights database (GARD) is necessary
and will benefit all stakeholders in the music licensing process, from
content creators to collective rights organizations to current and
prospective interactive music service providers.
I. LICENSES REQUIRED FOR INTERACTIVE MUSIC
STREAMING SERVICES

In the United States, there are two separately copyrightable
components of every song: the sound recording and the musical
composition. 28 Under the Copyright Act, any person or entity that wants
to publicly perform a piece of music must obtain a license for both the
sound recording and the musical work.29 This licensing system
previously worked well for the traditional means of distributing music,
such as vinyl records and CDs, but as the digital delivery of music has
increased, this seemingly simplistic licensing scheme has resulted in
many complications.
Interactive services allow users to seamlessly select a specific song
or album to stream, and in certain circumstances, users can temporarily
access their favorite music offline via these services. 30 Although ondemand streaming is convenient for users, the licensing process to
distribute music via interactive streaming is convoluted, and each
interactive service must obtain licenses for the following four rights: (1)
the right to perform the sound recording; (2) the right to reproduce and
distribute the sound recording; (3) the right to perform the musical

28. Rick Marshall, Oh Mercy: How On-Demand Interactive Streaming Services
Navigate the DigitalMusic Rights Licensing Landscape, 13 U. DENVER SPORTS & ENT. L.J.
23, 28 (2012).
29. Cody Duncan, The Case for CAPSL: Architectural Solutions to Licensing and
Distributionin EmergingMusic Markets, 13 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 162, 165 (2015).
30. Sofia Ritala, Pandora & Spotify: Legal Issues and Licensing Requirements for
Interactive and Non-Interactive Internet Radio Broadcasters,54 IDEA 23, 45 (2013).
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composition; and (4) the right to reproduce and distribute the musical
composition.31
The first and second rights, which pertain to sound recordings, are
implicated each time an interactive service streams a song because
streaming requires reproduction of the song and distribution of a
temporary copy to each user. 32 Sound recordings are typically the work
of artists, and the sound recording rights mentioned above are typically
owned by the respective artist's recording label.33 Currently, there are
no collective rights organizations that aggregate sound recording rights
for interactive services. 34 Thus, for on-demand music services to gain
authorization to make copies and publicly perform sound recordings
through digital transmissions, they must obtain a master-use license by
negotiating directly with the owner of the sound recording.35
The third right involves musical compositions, which are the works
of songwriters and consist of the music that the songwriter fixes in a
tangible medium of expression, including any accompanying lyrics. 36
The musical composition public performance right authorizes licensees
to play the song to the public 37 and is implicated by an interactive
service each time the service distributes a digital transmission of a song
that contains an author's musical composition. 38 It is relatively easy to
obtain a license for this third right due to the existence of performing
rights organizations (PROs). PROs offer public performance licenses for
musical compositions and collect royalties for most musical composition
right holders in the United States. 39 On-demand music service providers
may obtain blanket licenses from a PRO for all musical compositions in
the PRO's catalog. 40
The fourth right presents the greatest difficulties for interactive
music service providers. The mechanical rights of a musical
composition, which are implicated each time an interactive streaming
service reproduces a digital copy of a musical composition and

31. DANIEL S. PARK, JENNIFER LYNCH, & JENNIFER URBAN, STREAMLINING MUSIC
LICENSING TO FACILITATE DIGITAL MUSIC DELIVERY 5-6 (2011), https://www.public

knowledge.org/assets/uploads/blog/6_MusicLicensing.pdf.
32. Skyla Mitchell, Note, Reforming Section 115: Escape from the Byzantine World of
MechanicalLicensing, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1239, 1250-51 (2007).
33. See Lenard & White, supra note 26, at 9.
34. See PARK, LYNCH, & URBAN, supra note 31, at 3 (highlighting that there are no
entities that offer blanket licenses for the rights to all musical works).
35. RETHINK MUSIC, supra note 1, at 10.
36. Marshall, supra note 27, at 29.
37. PARK, LYNCH, & URBAN, supra note 31, at 6-7.
38. Marshall, supra note 28, at 35.
39. See Ritala, supra note 30, at 46-47.
40. Koransky, supra note 8, at 3.
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temporarily distributes it to a user, is also known as the right to
41
reproduce and distribute a musical composition.
Currently, there are three ways an on-demand service provider can
obtain mechanical rights licenses for musical compositions. One option
is to negotiate directly with the musical composition owner, typically the
songwriter, for the mechanical rights. 42 This option, however, is
generally avoided because it requires on-demand services to find and
43
negotiate direct licenses with thousands of songwriters and publishers,
44
which can be extremely inefficient and costly.
The second way to
obtain a license to the mechanical rights of a musical composition is
through the Harry Fox Agency (HFA), which administers mechanical
rights that parallel the rights administered by PROs for public
performance of musical compositions. 45 HFA licenses mechanical rights
through compulsory licenses authorized under Section 115 of the
Copyright Act, 46 which is discussed in greater detail below. A major
issue with HFA, however, is that it has only consolidated mechanical
rights for 60 to 65 percent of the market. 47 Additionally, licensees have
complained that the HFA application and approval process is arduous
and often results in denial of applications without explanation. 48
Furthermore, HFA does not guarantee the database's accuracy because
publishers can opt out of HFA's coverage at any time. 49 This lack of
accuracy subjects licensees to potential legal ramifications for copyright
infringement.50
If an interactive service provider wants to obtain the rights for a
musical composition not within HFA's catalog, a third and final option
is to apply for a compulsory mechanical license. Under Section 115,
copyright holders that do not utilize HFA's service are required to issue
mechanical licenses to any party that wants to distribute its musical
compositions to the public for private use. 51 This option requires the
licensee to comply with certain preconditions and pay the statutory rate

41. Marshall, supra note 28, at 36.
42. See PARK, LYNCH, & URBAN, supra note 31, at 8.
43. Id. at 3.
44. See id. at 4 (noting that the monetary and transaction costs of mechanical rights
licensing are high).
45. See Park, Lynch, & Urban, supra note 31, at 7.
46. 17 U.S.C.S. § 115(a) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
47. Park, Lynch, & Urban, supra note 31, at 7.
48. Id. at 7-8.
49. Id.
50. See 17 U.S.C.S. § 504 (LEXIS Pub. L. No. 115-140) (detailing the statutory
penalties for copyright infringement).
51. See 17 U.S.C.S. § 115(a) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
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set by the Copyright Royalty Board (CRB).52 One example of a
precondition for a compulsory mechanical license under Section 115 is
the notice of intention requirement, which states that the licensee must
inform all owners of the composition that it intends to acquire the
mechanical rights license. 53 The practicality of the notice of intention
requirement is debatable. The identity of the composer may be unknown
or the musical composition owner may be difficult to find, so providing
notice to all composition owners tends to be an onerous task. The
uncertainty of providing sufficient notice to these parties makes it
difficult for interactive services to comply with the requirements of
obtaining statutory mechanical licenses. Overall, obtaining compulsory
mechanical licenses from independent copyright holders is disfavored
due to the burdensome preconditions, not to mention the high ceiling on
the rates that the CRB promulgates. 54
Due to the complexity of music licensing, it may be easier to
understand the requisite licenses for interactive music streaming
services graphically rather than verbally. Accordingly, the chart below
details each right implicated through interactive streaming and the
different options available to service providers for securing the
necessary licenses.
Table 1: License Requirements for Interactive Music
Services

Type of Right

Options for Obtaining
License

Public Performance Right

1. Negotiate Directly with
the Rights Holder
1. Negotiate Directly with
the Rights Holder

Right to Reproduce & Right
to Distribute (Mechanical
Rights)

CZ

Public Performance Right

U

_the

1. Utilize a Performing
Rights Organization (e.g.,
ASCAP, BMI, SESAC)
2. Negotiate Directly with
Rights Holder

52. Id.
53.
54.

17 U.S.C.S. § 115(b) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
Marshall, supra note 28, at 37.
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1. Utilize the Harry Fox
Agency (HFA)

Right to Reproduce &
Right to Distribute
(Mechanical Rights)

2. Apply for a Compulsory
Mechanical Rights License
Under § 115 of the
Copyright Act

3. Negotiate Directly with
the Rights Holder

II. BACKGROUND ON COLLECTIVE RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES

A. The Role of Collective Rights Organizationsin the United States
Although music rights holders can choose between individual
management or collective rights management,5 5 artists and composers
with numerous works rely on collective management out of
practicality. 56 Without collective rights organizations, such as PROs and
the HFA, delegating rights to each musical creation would be an
"insuperable management problem for individual copyright owners."57
In the United States, there are only a few collective rights organizations
that administer licenses for the rights that interactive service providers
implicate in the process of streaming music to users. With respect to
performance rights, the primary organizations available to on-demand
service providers are the American Society of Composers, Authors and
Publishers ("ASCAP") and Broadcast Music, Inc. ("BMI").58 There are
55. Press Release, European Commission, Directive on Collective Management of
Copyright and Related Rights and Multi-Territorial Licensing - Frequently Asked
Questions (Feb. 2, 2014), http://www.europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseMEMO- 14-79_en.pdf.
56.

See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT AND THE MUSIC MARKETPLACE: A REPORT

OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 32 (2015), https://copyright.gov/policy/musiclicensing
study/copyright-and-the-music-marketplace.pdf (explaining that the high frequency of
public performances makes it nearly impossible for individual copyright owners to manage
their music rights on their own).
57.

58.

CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 542 (10th ed. 2016).
See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 56, at 150.
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also two smaller PROs that are becoming prevalent in the United
States: Society of European Stage Authors and Composers (SESAC) and
Global Music Rights (GMR).59 ASCAP and BMI are the two largest
PROs, and together they represent over 90 percent of the songs
available for licensing in the United States. 60 ASCAP and BMI must
distribute royalties according to governmentally imposed consent
decrees. 61 Contrastingly, SESAC and GMR are private and are not
currently required to adhere to any consent decrees. 62
Each major PRO uses a separate process to track music use and
calculate royalties. 63 This lack of consistency across organizations may
decrease accuracy in reporting throughout the industry. Although
SESAC uses a technological scanning device to track the digital
fingerprint of a song, 64 a seemingly accurate measure, ASCAP and BMI
use undisclosed equations based on arbitrary airtime samples to track
the use of songs. 65 This is particularly concerning because, as mentioned
previously, ASCAP and BMI currently manage rights for a significant
portion of the music market in the United States. 66 Additionally,
ASCAP and BMI established their standard operating procedures in the
analog era, 67 when data was represented in a physical way, such as
surface grooves on a vinyl record. Consequently, effectively functioning
in the digital era will be difficult for collective rights organizations if
they fail to modernize their operations to more efficiently and accurately
manage digital rights.
Aside from performance rights, interactive services also require
mechanical rights to legally operate in the digital realm. Similar to
ASCAP and BMI, HFA is the primary collecting society that
administers mechanical rights. 68 Again, there are other services
emerging in this area, such as Loudr 69 and Music Reports, Inc., 70 but
59. Lenard & White, supra note 26, at 8.
60. Sisario, supranote 27.
61. For ASCAP consent decree, see United States v. ASCAP, 41-1395, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23707 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2001). For BMI consent decree, see United States v.
Broad. Music, Inc., 64 Civ. 3787, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21476 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1994).
62. Lenard & White, supra note 26, at 8.
63. Thomas Witt Godden, US and European Music Copyright and Collections,
BERKLEE COLL. OF MUSIC: Music Bus. JOURNAL (Dec. 2010), http://www.thembj.org/
2010/12/us-and-european-music-copyright-and-collections/.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Sisario, supranote 27.
67. Lenard & White, supra note 26, at 5.
68. See PARK, LYNCH, & URBAN, supra note 31, at 8.
69. For more information about Loudr, see FAQ, LOUDR, https://loudr.fm/faq.
70. For more information about Music Reports Inc., see Frequently Asked Questions,
Music REPORTS (2018), https://www.musicreports.com/musicreports/pages/faq.php.
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these new mechanical rights organizations have yet to adequately
establish themselves in the market relative to HFA.71 Unlike ASCAP
and BMI, which cover a majority of the music market, the operations of
HFA are limited because HFA currently manages mechanical rights for
roughly half of the music market. 72
In July 2015, HFA was acquired by SESAC.73 Due to this
acquisition, SESAC is now capable of licensing both the performance
and mechanical rights of a musical composition. Although this may
reflect a figurative step in the right direction, SESAC's acquisition of
HFA is unlikely to make a noticeable impact in improving music
licensing because SESAC and HFA have a somewhat trivial market
share in the United States. If ASCAP and BMI identify a way to follow
suit, more substantial advances could be made. Additionally, SESAC
will likely need to address operational issues with HFA before it can
effectively offer mechanical rights licenses in addition to performance
rights licenses. As mentioned above, HFA has received complaints
regarding its application process and database accuracy, and additional
evidence suggests HFA is slothful in filing Section 115 notice of
intentions, 74 which causes infringement liability risk to licensees.
B. The Role of Collective Rights Organizationsin the European Union
Collective management organizations (CMOs) handle the collective
management of rights in the European Union by primarily granting
licenses on behalf of right holders, and collecting and distributing the
corresponding royalties. 7 5 The practice of using CMOs to manage the
rights of content owners in conjunction with the copyright laws of each
respective country in the European Union emerged as early as 1926.76

CMOs manage the rights of authors, performers, and other kinds of

71. See PARK, LYNCH, & URBAN, supra note 31, at 3 (noting that the HFA licenses
mechanical rights for a large number of musical compositions and is the only centralized
distributor of mechanical rights).
72. See id. (stating that HFA's catalog does not cover all nondramatic musical works).
73. SESAC to Acquire the Harry Fox Agency, SESAC (July 7, 2015) https://
www.sesac.com/News/NewsDetails.aspx?id=2253.
74. See Mike Masnick, Music Licensing Shop Harry Fox Agency Appears to Be
Scrambling to Fix Its Failure to Properly License Songs, TECHDIRT (Mar. 11, 2016, 2:07
PM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/201603 10/23295633867/music-licensing-shop-har
ry-fox-agency-appears-to-be-scrambling-to-fix-failure-to-properly-license-songs.shtml.
75. Press Release, supra note 55, at 2-3.
76. Kristen Greeley, Note, Recommendations, Communications, and Directives, Oh
My: How the European Union Isn't Solving its Licensing Problem, 44 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1523,
1528 (2013).
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right holders,77 but CMOs are of particular importance in the licensing
of rights of musical works.78 More than 80 percent of the income CMOs
collect each year is derived from musical creations.79
Owners of music rights typically become members of CMOs to
simplify the administrative process of distributing their work.8 0 By
becoming a member of a CMO, music rights owners authorize CMOs to
act on their behalf in negotiations with potential users, such as online
services, radios, and department stores. 81 CMOs are also responsible for
monitoring the use of licensed works and collecting and distributing
royalties to each respective member. 82 The repertoire of a CMO is
usually limited to domestic works and comprises the rights of all of the
members the CMO represents. 83 CMOs often provide users with blanket
licenses, which may consist of numerous works from various content
creators, thereby taking advantage of the economies of scale and
allowing users to legally access the CMOs' entire music inventory. 84
There are twenty-five CMOs in Europe that manage musical
performance and mechanical rights, and each organization is the sole
representative of a country in the European Union.85 Typically, a music
rights CMO in Europe has exclusive administrative rights to distribute
public performance licenses and mechanical licenses and collect the
corresponding royalties. 86 Historically, and even more so under the 2014
European Union Directive, which is discussed below, the music rights
CMOs in Europe are more highly regulated compared to similar
organizations in the United States. The European Union regulates each
CMO via a system called DJMonitor, which uses fingerprinting
technology to track songs in a digital database.8 7 Overall, European
CMOs strive for transparency, and through increased regulation and
the utilization of systems such as DJMonitor, Europe is becoming more
adept at accurately tracking music use, tying that use to ownership, and
properly compensating the corresponding content owners.
One complication that CMOs in Europe face, which is perhaps more
applicable to the European Union than the United States, is licensing
77. Press Release, supra note 55, at 3.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See Greeley, supra note 76 (stating that "CMOs ...
relieve the burden on artists
and composers to independently monitor all uses of their works").
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Press Release, supra note 55, at 3.
84. Greeley, supra note 76.
85. Godden, supra note 63.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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music across territories. Given Europe's territorial approach to rights
management,8 8 a prospective on-demand music service provider has to
negotiate licenses with twenty-five different CMOs to distribute music
throughout the European Union. The challenge of negotiating licenses
with numerous territories is under continuous scrutiny. Traditionally,
European CMOs circumvented this difficulty by using reciprocal
representation agreements to grant each other the right to license
repertoires in each other's territory.89 As discussed below, the Directive
considered the difficulty of multi-territorial licensing and implemented
changes to address this issue in the future.90
CMOs are vital entities in the process of obtaining and managing
the rights that are necessary for interactive music service providers to
provide music to their users. On-demand music service providers seek to
cover many territories and offer a large portfolio of music. 9 1 In their
original operation, CMOs lacked the capacity to process or match data
in a way that was beneficial, and to a certain extent necessary, for
existing and prospective interactive music service providers to be
successful.92 The inefficiencies historically associated with CMOs made
digital rights licensing challenging in the European Union. In response
to vast concerns regarding the operations of CMOs, the European Union
adopted a directive on collective rights management that, of particular
importance for this Note, aimed to improve multi-territorial licensing by
CMOs of authors' rights in musical works for online use. 93
III. OVERVIEW OF THE 2014 EUROPEAN UNION DIRECTIVE AND THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR CMOs THAT MANAGE MUSIC RIGHTS

The purpose of the 2014 European Union Directive on collective
rights management and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical
works for online uses is three-fold. First, it aims to establish standards
for governance, transparency, and financial management to improve
how CMOs are managed. 94 Second, it lays out common standards to
streamline multi-territorial licensing for CMOs that manage rights in
88. See Press Release, supra note 55, at 3 (explaining that CMOs in the EU are
historically established on a national basis and license rights for their own territory).
89. Id. at 11.
90. See Directive 2014/26, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26
February 2014 on Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights and MultiTerritorial Licensing of Rights in Musical Works for Online Use in the Internal Market,
2014 O.J. (L 84) 72, 90-93.
91. Press Release, supra note 55, at 4.
92. Id.
93. See Directive 2014/26, supra note 90.
94. Press Release, supra note 55, at 5.
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musical works for online use.95 Finally, it aims to provide additional
changes that will increase legal access to online music. 96
The Directive will greatly benefit right holders, service providers,
and consumers.9 7 Service providers will face lower transaction costs
because the changes required under the Directive will allow service
providers to tie use to ownership more efficiently. One hope of the
European Union is that this reduction in transaction costs will invite
the creation of new online services and increase the availability of
creative content to European consumers. 98 Additionally, the standards
enshrined by the Directive will presumably lead to more accurate and
transparent management of CMOs, which will improve revenue
appropriation for content owners.
The parts of the Directive that are of particular importance to this
Note are the governance and transparency standards the Directive
imposes and the additional requirements it establishes for CMOs that
manage authors' rights in musical works. Right holders are only able to
exercise their rights if they have comprehendible information from the
CMOs. To address this point, not only does the Directive require CMOs
to include right holders in the decision-making process, it also requires
that CMOs increase the availability of useful information to right
holders,

other CMOs,

service providers,

and the general public. 9 9

Additionally, CMOs must ensure that they are appropriately collecting
revenues on behalf of the right holders they represent. 100
The Directive also notes that CMOs, considering their role in
collecting and managing revenue that ultimately belongs to right
holders, must improve their financial management practices. 101 Under
the Directive, CMOs must manage royalty revenue separate from their
own assets and should ensure sufficient transparency on any deduction
they make. 102 The Directive also requires CMOs to distribute royalties
no later than nine months from the end of the financial year during
which the amounts were collected. 103 Finally, CMOs are required to
publish information about their structure and financial management on
their website, including an annual report that lists detailed accounts
and financial information. 104
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Press Release, supra note 55, at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id.
See Directive 2014/26, supranote 90, at 90.
Press Release, supra note 55, at 8.
Id.
Id. at 9.
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The aforementioned standards apply to all CMOs, but the Directive
also implemented specific requirements for CMOs that manage authors'
rights in musical works. To adapt to the digital era, the Directive
requires CMOs to enhance their capabilities to process large amounts of
data and accurately identify the works used by service providers. 105
Additionally, CMOs must improve their operations to be able to quickly
invoice service providers and distribute accurate royalties to right
holders. 106 Overall, the standards imposed by the Directive aim to
streamline the licensing process in the European Union. Once the
changes discussed in the Directive are implemented, CMOs will operate
more efficiently and it will be more practical for digital service providers
to create and manage new music platforms for European consumers.
IV. REFINING COLLECTIVE MUSIC RIGHTS MANAGEMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES

Proposed solutions for simplifying digital rights licensing range
from moving to a free market negotiation structure for all rights in
music 1 0 7 to establishing a new protocol for distributing music that uses

technical tools currently available on the internet. 108 This section
suggests that the most plausible first step for modernizing music
licensing for interactive services is implementing a transparency and
governance framework for the collective rights organizations in the
United States that license rights to on-demand service providers.
Additionally, this section proposes the creation of additional collective
rights organizations to administer mechanical rights to interactive
services. The section closes by suggesting that the creation of a global
rights database is necessary to modernize music licensing.
A. Establishinga Governance and TransparencyFrameworkfor PROs
Current negotiations between streaming services, such as Spotify,
and collective rights organizations (referred to as CMOs in the EU) or
independent right holders have proven to be costly and timeconsuming. 109 These negotiations also take place privately via a
nondisclosure agreement, which prevents transparency and may cause
artists to feel skeptical about the underlying license or per-stream
105. Id. at 10.
106. Id.
107. Karen (Kai-Wen) Hsieh, Note, Unlock the Music: Replacing Compulsory Music
Licenses with Free Market Negotiation, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 595, 597 (2016).
108. Duncan, supra note 29, at 164.
109. PARK, LYNCH, & URBAN, supra note 31, at 4.
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rates. 110 Consequently, prominent artists, such as Taylor Swift, have
pulled their music from certain streaming services, 111 which could
impede progress and innovation in the music industry. It is long
overdue that collective rights organizations in the United States that
manage music rights increase their tracking and transparency
capabilities. This will allow content owners to feel confident that their
payments are fair and justified,11 2 and will further allow current and
prospective service providers to efficiently obtain the music rights
necessary for their platforms.
The United States Copyright Office should implement a governance
and transparency framework that regulates the operations of collective
rights organizations in the United States, with a specific focus on music
rights. In doing so, the Copyright Office should adopt some of the
measures implemented in the 2014 European Union Directive on
collective rights management. Specifically, to increase efficiency and
accuracy, the respective collective rights organizations should be
required to enhance their technological capabilities to a standard level
that allows the respective organizations to accurately process large
amounts of streaming data, quickly identify right holders, and convey
this information to on-demand service providers.
Standards should also be created to make the operations of
collective rights organizations in the United States more transparent.
This can be accomplished by requiring the collective rights
organizations to involve content owners and service providers in certain
decision-making processes that ultimately affect both parties.
Furthermore, standard financial management practices can be
established that require collective rights organizations to provide
comprehensible royalty information to content owners and prohibit
collective rights organizations from collecting royalties that will
ultimately end up in a "black box."
The lack of transparency in the current system in place in the
United States irrefutably benefits the "middlemen." 113 Currently, it is
the intermediaries, such as PROs and the HFA, that benefit from the
complex and inaccurate licensing system, and none of these collective
rights organizations have any incentive to invest in better tracking,
reporting, or accounting systems. Thus, a governance and transparency
framework should be imposed on these intermediaries to encourage
modernization of the music licensing process and create a system where
everyone in the music industry values chain benefits equally.
110. RETHINK MUSIC, supra note 1, at 16.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 18.
113. See id. at 9-10.
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B. CreatingAdditional Collective Rights Organizationsto Manage
MechanicalRights
An ongoing recommendation among many primary stakeholders in
the music industry is the creation of organizations that manage all of
the rights associated with on-demand streaming services. 114 Although
this sounds feasible, it is unlikely that the current organizations that
administer portions of the digital transmission rights, primarily ASCAP
and BMI, will be willing to allow new organizations to undercut their
respective market share. 115 A more practical solution is for ASCAP and
BMI to take a similar approach as SESAC, and either acquire one of the
emerging mechanical rights organizations or create an in-house
department or subsidiary to administer licenses for mechanical rights.
If ASCAP and BMI transition into "one-stop shop" organizations for
musical composition rights, much of the complexities and efficiency
issues that currently exist in licensing rights for musical works may be
remediated.
Once ASCAP and BMI have the capability to license all the required
rights of musical compositions, an additional recommendation is to
amend Section 115 to establish a blanket mechanical license for digital
uses, which will allow an interactive music service provider to obtain a
repertoire-wide mechanical license.11 6 Perhaps ASCAP, BMI, and
SESAC can be charged with acting as collection agents for the
mechanical rights compulsory blanket licensing scheme, and the scheme
can provide fixed royalty rates for music that is digitally streamed. The
recommended transition of ASCAP and BMI into organizations that can
manage all rights for purposes of digital transmissions, in connection
with offering blanket licensing for mechanical rights, would be a
significant step toward simplifying music licensing, and thereby
increasing content distribution and digital service innovation in the
United States.
C. Creatinga Global Authoritative Rights Database
Currently, it can take months or even years to identify rights
holders and negotiate the appropriate licenses,117 and this seems to act
as a barrier of entry to new services that are interested in getting
involved in the on-demand music service space. The success of
interactive services like Apple Music and Spotify will likely increase
114. Marshall, supra note 28, at 49.
115. Id.
116. Koransky, supra note 8, at 5-6.
117. RETHINK MUSIC, supra note 1, at 21.
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with easier rights identification mechanisms. The easier it is for
services to identify and obtain rights to music, the more music they will
be able to offer and the more users they are likely to attract.
The modern music business generates millions of micro-transactions
throughout the world each day involving the buying and selling of songs
and albums, 118 and the music licensing system needs to evolve to
support future opportunities of growth and innovation. Jim Lucchese,
the CEO of The Echo Nest, a music intelligence and data platform for
developers and media companies, stated that "[a]pplication developers
are the future of the music business." 119 After surveying 10,000
application developers, Lucchese learned that the number one problem
developers faced in building commercial music applications was music
licensing difficulties. 120
From a technical perspective, music licensing can be made more
efficient through the creation of a global authoritative rights database
(GARD) that accurately details and tracks global ownership and control
of music rights. Although current technology is able to track every song
streamed in real-time around the world, 121 an effective way to share
information downstream is lacking. This could be accomplished by
creating a global rights database. The necessary components of such a
database include the owners of each digital transmission right, contact
information for the rights holders, and the rates the respective rights
owners accept. 122
For a global rights database to be successful, a standardized system
of unique identifiers must also be created for all past, present, and
future musical creations. The identifier should correspond to all types of
copyright for a single work, including the digital transmission rights.
None of the systems of identifiers currently in practice provide an
exhaustive, reliable way to identify which licenses are needed to avoid
copyright infringement. 123
Given the magnitude of the task and the corresponding difficulty,
establishing a single, authoritative database has proven to be only a
dream of the future. For instance, fourteen key figures in the global
music industry, including Universal Music Publishing, Warner/Chappell
118.
119.

Id. at 5.

GLOB. ENTM'T & MusIc Bus. PROGRAM, BERKLEE COLL. OF MusIc, NEW BUSINESS
MODELS IN THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 19 (2013), https://staticl.squarespace.com/static/

552cO535e4b0afcbed88dc53/t/55302 1e3e4b0 12ff28709a3f/14292 17763895/rethink-music2013-framing-paper.pdf.
120. Id.
121. RETHINK MUSIC, supra note 1, at 10.
122. Marshall, supra note 28, at 51.
123. See id. (highlighting the shortcomings of HFAs "song code" system in its Songfile
database).
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Music, GEMA, SACEM, Apple, and Google, initiated an effort in 2009 to
develop a Global Repertoire Database (GRD).124 The GRD was
considered the "most ambitious, complex endeavor the music industry
has ever set out to achieve," 125 and although it had the support of many
prominent entities within the music industry, efforts backing the
creation of the GRD came to a halt in July 2014.126 Similarly, the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has proposed the
International Music Registry (IMR), which seeks to centralize the
different rights management systems used throughout the world, 127 but
the success of the IMR remains unseen. Numerous parties appear to be
working in silos to create a global system of rights ownership, which
prolongs the unsolved problem of needing a uniform system to connect
music use and streams to ownership. 128 Instead, prominent stakeholders
in the global music industry need to combine efforts and work together
to determine the best means of creating a uniform global rights
database.
Aside from the unconsolidated efforts to create a uniform rights
system, there are additional difficulties impeding the development of a
GARD, such as the need for an easily adaptable database and the
challenge of obtaining the support of collective rights organizations and
music right holders throughout the world. Ownership data is subject to
updates and changes. For example, there are situations in which artists
and songwriters renegotiate the terms of certain licenses.129 Thus, a
global rights system must have the capacity to efficiently adapt to
ownership updates. Collective rights organizations, artists, labels, and
individual music creators may require incentives to contribute their
repertoires to the database and financially support the creation of the
database. 130 Perhaps a system of incentives should be established up
front to increase cooperation, but at the very least, all of the
stakeholders previously mentioned should be incentivized by the fact
that a GARD will accelerate rights identification, lower transaction

124. GLOB. ENTM'T & MuSIC Bus. PROGRAM, supra note 119, at 16-17.
125. Id. at 17.

126. Klementina Milosic, GRD's Failure, BERKLEE COLL. OF MUSIC:
JOURNAL (Aug. 2015), http://www.thembj.org/2015/08/grds-failure/.

MuSIC Bus.

127. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supranote 56, at 67.
128. See id. (discussing efforts to establish the GRD); GLOB. ENTM'T & MUSIC Bus.
PROGRAM, supra note 119, at 16-17 (discussing efforts to establish the IMR); Marshall,
supra note 28, at 51 (discussing efforts to establish Songfile).
129. Greeley, supra note 76, at 1550.
130. See Lenard & White, supra note 26, at 25 (arguing that certain protections against
potential infringement cases by distributors will incentivize music rights owners to
contribute music and financially support the database).
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CONCLUSION

The time is now for the United States Copyright Office and
Congress to take a fresh look at interactive music services much like it
has done for other innovations in the past. The current music licensing
system is stuck in the analog era, and serious changes to music
licensing are necessary to allow all key stakeholders in the music
industry, especially interactive service providers, to prosper in the
digital era. Perhaps music licensing will always be complex due to the
rapid technological advancement associated with the music industry. A
prime illustration of this accelerated development is the fact that digital
media and streaming were unknown concepts when the laws governing
music rights were established. Nevertheless, through operational,
structural, and technological improvements, transparency and efficiency
in music licensing are achievable.
Collective rights organizations in the United States allow ondemand services to streamline music licensing to a certain extent, but
there is substantial room for improvement considering the many
inefficiencies related to collective rights organizations listed throughout
this Note. The 2014 European Union Directive implemented key
changes for CMOs that manage music rights to increase transparency
and accuracy. The United States should consider adopting similar
governance and transparency standards, and should also consider
establishing "one-stop shops" for digital music licensing where possible
to simplify music licensing.
A consolidated, authoritative rights database that utilizes a system
of unique identifiers would make the proposed changes to collective
rights organizations much easier to achieve. Creating and implementing
a GARD that ties usage to ownership would not only accelerate royalty
payment determinations and increase accuracy in invoicing, but it
would also create a less complex, more transparent licensing system.
Overall, a more transparent and efficient music licensing system could
reduce the administrative difficulties interactive service providers
currently experience in obtaining the required digital transmission
rights to music, and effectively move music licensing into the digital
age.

